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The Limits of Antitrust in the 21st Century
Thomas A. Lambert*
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust is having a moment. Commentators and policymakers, both
progressive and conservative, are calling for increased antitrust
enforcement to address all manner of social ills. From technology
platforms' power over speech' and encroachments on user privacy2 to
wage stagnation in more concentrated labor markets,3 to competitionsoftening from ever-larger index funds,' to growing income inequality,

. Wall Family Chair in Corporate Law and Governance and Professor of Law at the University of
Missouri Law School.
1. See, e.g., Donald Trump, Jr., Free Speech Suppression Online Builds Case to Break Up Big

Tech, THE HILL (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/463631-free
-speech-suppression-online-builds-case-to-break-up-big-tech [https://perma.cc/P9YG-VC8X] ("Free
speech is under attack by the Big Tech monopolies that dominate the internet.").
2. See, e.g., Dina Srinivasan, Why Privacy Is an Antitrust Issue, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2019),

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/opinion/privacy-antitrust-facebook.html
[https://perma.cc
/ZT7Y-DDV3] ("This is how Facebook usurped our privacy: with the help of its market dominance.
The price of using Facebook has stayed the same over the years (it's free to join and use), but the cost
of using it, calculated in terms of the amount of data that users now must provide, is an order of
magnitude above what it was when Facebook faced real competition.").
3.

See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger & Eric Posner, CorporateAmerica Is Suppressing Wagesfor Many

Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/opinion/corporate
-america-suppressing-wages.html [https://perma.cc/GR4A-STF6] ("The culprit is 'monopsony
power.' This term is used by economists to refer to the ability of an employer to suppress wages below
the efficient or perfectly competitive level of compensation.").
4. See, e.g., Eric Posner, Fiona Scott Morton & Glen Weyl, A Monopoly Donald Trump Can
Pop, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/opinion/a-monopoly-donald
-trump-can-pop.html [https://perma.cc/64ZR-6FR9] ("The great, but mostly unknown, antitrust story
of our time is the astonishing rise of the institutional investor-a large company, like a mutual fund
company, insurance company, pension fund or asset management firm, that buys stock in substantial
quantities for the benefit of clients and customers-and the challenge that it poses to market
competition.").
5.

See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker& Steven C. Salop,Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality,

104 GEo. L.. ONLINE 1, 14 (2015) ("Concerns with inequality can implicate antitrust and competition
policy in two general ways. First, in that market power contributes to inequality, more aggressive
antitrust enforcement might play a remedial role. Second, antitrust enforcers and regulatory agencies
such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) might make reducing the effects of inequality
a high priority in developing enforcement and regulatory initiatives.").
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reduced innovation,6 and threats to democracy itself'-the list of maladies
for which antitrust has been proposed as a remedy goes on and on.
Antitrust enforcers have taken note. From Fall 2018 through Spring
2019, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) held fourteen hearings
on "Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century."" The
FTC considered such diverse topics as common ownership by institutional
investors, labor market monopsony, consumer privacy, effects of "big
data," predatory and exclusionary tactics of technology platforms,
algorithms and artificial intelligence, and vertical mergers. 9 In Summer
2019, the FTC joined the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) in announcing probes of Google, Apple, Facebook, and
Amazon (colloquially referred to as GAFA).' 0 And the action is not
limited to the federal level; more than forty-six state attorneys general have
joined the fray with their own investigations of Facebook (led by
Democrat Letitia James of New York)" and Google (led by Republican
Ken Paxton of Texas).' 2
In light of policymakers' heightened interest in antitrust and the recent
flurry of bipartisan enforcement activity, it is worth stepping back to ask a
couple of big-picture questions: What are antitrust's limits in addressing
the social harms that are motivating calls for more aggressive
enforcement? And how should enforcers and courts proceed in light of
6. See, e.g., Derek Thompson, America's Monopoly Problem: How Big Business Jammed the
Wheels of Innovation, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive

/2016/10/americas-monopoly-problem/497549/ [https://perma.cc/X728-3Q6X] ("This decline in
dynamism has coincided with the rise of extraordinarily large and profitable firms that look
discomfortingly like the monopolies and oligopolies of the 19th century.").
7. See Ganesh Sitaraman,

Unchecked Power: How Monopolies Have Flourished-and

Undermined Democracy, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 29, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/152294
/unchecked-power [https://perma.cc/LUS7-HRFU] ("When economic power is concentrated, it
destroys not only economic freedom but also political freedom, as the wealthy and powerful use their
resources to capture the government and rig it in their favor."). See generally TIM Wu, THE CURSE
OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018) [hereinafter Wu, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS].
8. FED. TRADE COMM'N, Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st

Century, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/hearings-competition-consumer-protection
/M2LA-6DBK] (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).
9. See id. (cataloguing hearing topics).

[https://perma.cc

10. See Brent Kendall, Justice Department to Open Broad, New Antitrust Review of Big Tech

Companies, WALL STREET J. (July 23, 2019, 5:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice
-department-to-open-broad-new-antitrust-review-of-big-tech-companies- 11563914235
[https://
perma.cc/T5GM-7PLF]; Brian Fung, FTC Ramping Up Its Big Tech Antitrust Investigations, CNN

BUS. (Sept. 11, 2019, 2:53 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/11/tech/ftc-big-tech-antitrust
-investigations/index.html [https://perma.cc/RKG9-FVBH].
11. Tony Room, Forty-Six Attorneys General Have Joined a New York-Led Antitrust

Investigation ofFacebook, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2019, 12:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/technology/2019/10/22/forty-six-attomeys-general-have-joined-new-york-led-antitrust-investigation
-into-facebook [https://perma.cc/L775-68D7].
12. Lauren Feiner, Google Faces a New Antitrust Probe by 50Attorneys General, CNBC (Sept.

9, 2019 2:05 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/09/texas-attomey-general-leads-google-antitrust
-probe.html [https://perma.cc/CVA6-UPVU].
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those limits?
These questions are not new. In 1984, Judge (then Professor) Frank
Easterbrook addressed them in an article entitled The Limits ofAntitrust.13
Few antitrust articles-or law review articles generally-have had the
influence of that writing. Cited over 650 times in law journals, 4 its central
idea appears to underlie most of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent antitrust
decisions.15
This Article revisits The Limits of Antitrust in light of the current
antitrust moment.
Part I describes the central components of
Easterbrook's 1984 proposal and considers, for each, whether and how it
should be revised in light of subsequent market developments and
advances in economic learning. Part I concludes that Easterbrook's
overarching prescription for maximizing antitrust's effectiveness remains
fundamentally sound but that his view about the relative harms from overand under-enforcement, as well as some of the specific screening
mechanisms he proposed for optimizing antitrust's effectiveness, require
some adjustment.
Part II then builds upon Easterbrook's approach by proposing four
new screening mechanisms that could assist twenty-first century courts
and enforcers in ensuring that antitrust secures as much social welfare as
possible, given its intrinsic limitations.
The proposed screening
mechanisms would limit antitrust intervention to situations in which the
complained of conduct (1) causes or threatens harm to consumers, (2)
extends market power, (3) is unlikely to be addressed by other bodies of
law or privately ordered solutions, and (4) does not involve a remedy
requiring a great deal of information or endowing government officials
with substantial discretionary authority.

I.

ASSESSING THE LIMITS OFANTITRUST
6 and then turn to
We begin with a summary of The Limits ofAntitrustM

assess the merits of its prescriptions in light of twenty-first century
developments.

13. See generallyFrank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).

14. A Westlaw search of "Law Reviews and Journals" lists 654 articles citing Easterbrook's
article as of April 10, 2020.
15. See Thomas A. Lambert & Alden F. Abbott, Recognizing the Limits ofAntitrust: The Roberts
Court Versus the Enforcement Agencies, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 791, 793 (2015) ("[T]he

federal judiciary-in particular, the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts-has
largely endorsed Easterbrook's limits of antitrust approach."); Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court
and the Limits ofAntitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV. 871, 871-74 (2011) (noting the current U.S. Supreme
Court's treatment of antitrust cases).
16. See generallyEasterbrook, supra note 13.
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Three CentralComponents of The Limits of Antitrust

The approach set forth in The Limits of Antitrust included three
components. Judge Easterbrook set forth an overarching objective for
antitrust courts and enforcers, offered advice on how to weigh different
costs in making intervention decisions, and posited a set of specific
screening mechanisms that would help achieve antitrust's overarching

goal. 17
1.

The Overarching Objective

To understand the objective Easterbrook posited for antitrust courts
and enforcers, it may help to consider antitrust's "domain"-i.e., the type
of activity it regulates. Antitrust is concerned with business behaviors that
generate market power: coordinated conduct that leads to collusion' and
exclusionary actions that create monopoly power.1 9 The difficulty is that
many acts of coordination between firms enhance market output, and
many business practices that usurp business from the actor's rivals-and
thus "exclude" them from the market-also generate benefits for
consumers.
For example, resale price maintenance may facilitate
collusion but may also encourage dealer-provided services by preventing
free-riding; 20 manufacturers' exclusive dealing agreements may raise
rivals' costs of distribution but may also spur manufacturer investment in
distributors by reducing interbrand free-riding; 2 1 extremely low prices
may drive rivals from the market, but they offer an obvious and immediate
benefit to consumers.2 2 These are typical of the behaviors antitrust
addresses: they involve both upsides and downsides, and thus may be, on
17. See generally id.

18. Such conduct is policed by Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (forbidding
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade), and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018)
(forbidding anticompetitive mergers).
19. Such actions are policed by Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (forbidding
monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize), and Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018) (forbidding exclusive dealing and tying arrangements that reduce
market competition).
20. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889-94 (2007)
(cataloguing potential pro- and anti-competitive effects of minimum resale price maintenance).
21. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, Procompetitive Justificationsfor Exclusive
Dealing:Preventing Free-Ridingand CreatingIncentivesfor Undivided Dealer Loyalty, U.S. DEP'T

OF JUSTICE (draft Nov. 12, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/atr/procompetitive-justifications
-exclusive-dealing-preventing-free-riding-and-creating-undivided#2 [https://perma.cc/LE2G-CXPF]
(explaining that exclusive dealing may be used to prevent free-riding in certain cases, such as the
standard case where dealers use promotional assets supplied by the manufacturer to sell rival
products).
22. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-26 (1993)
(discussing benefits and potential competitive concerns from extremely low prices and setting liability
rules to avoid squelching consumer benefits).
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net, either output-enhancing (procompetitive) or output-reducing
(anticompetitive). They are, in short, mixed bags.
Regulating competitive mixed bags inevitably entails costs. 23 First,
there are the costs that result from mistaken judgments.24 If the regulator
wrongly allows conduct that is, on net, anticompetitive, consumers will
face higher prices and/or reduced quality, and a deadweight loss will
occur. 25 But if the regulator wrongly forbids conduct that is, on balance,
procompetitive, market output will be lower than it otherwise would be
and, again, consumers will suffer.26 Both false convictions (Type I errors)
and false acquittals (Type II errors) generate losses. 27
In addition to these so-called error costs, regulating competitive mixed
bags entails significant costs of simply deciding whether contemplated or
actual conduct is forbidden or permitted.28 Such "decision costs" must be
borne by business planners (who are attempting to avoid liability), by
litigating parties (who are trying to prove their case), and by adjudicators
(who must decide whether the law has been broken).
Type I error costs, Type II error costs, and decision costs are
intertwined.29 If policymakers try to reduce the risk of false conviction
(Type I error) by making it harder for a plaintiff to establish liability or
easier for a defendant to make out a defense, they will increase the risk of
false acquittal (Type II error).30 If they ease a plaintiffs burden or cut
back on available defenses to reduce false acquittals, they will tend to
enhance the social losses from false convictions. 3 1 And if they make the
rule more nuanced in an effort to condemn the bad without chilling the
good, thereby reducing error costs overall, they enhance decision costs. 3 2
As in a game of whack-a-mole, driving down costs in one area will cause
them to rise elsewhere.
In light of antitrust's inevitable and intertwined costs of error and
23. Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 4 ("Antitrust is costly. The judges act with imperfect
information about the effects of the practices at stake. The costs of action and information are the
limits of antitrust.").

24. These are Easterbrook's "costs of action." See id. at 21 ("The costs of judicial error are borne
by consumers, who lose the efficient practices and get nothing in return.").
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. These are Easterbrook's "costs of... information." Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 4.
Easterbrook explains, "The traditional Rule of Reason falls prey to all of the limits of antitrust. It
assumes that judges can tap a fount of economic knowledge that does not exist, and it disregards the
costs of judicial decisionmaking (including the costs of damning efficient conduct by mistake or
design)." Id. at 39.
29.

See THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW To REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 10-12 (2017)

(explaining the differences and similarities between Type I and Type II error costs).
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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decision-what he called, collectively, the "limits of antitrust"33
Easterbrook proposed an overarching goal for antitrust policies: They
should be crafted so as to minimize the sum of error and decision costs. 3 4
Pursuing such an objective, policymakers would not try to prevent every
anticompetitive act, allow every procompetitive one, or keep antitrust
rules as simple as possible. In keeping with Voltaire's prudent maxim,
"the perfect is the enemy of the good," 35 they would eschew perfection
along any single dimension in favor of overall optimization. This would
ensure that antitrust, despite its limits, accomplishes as much good as
possible.
2.

The Notion of Incommensurate Harms

The second key component of Easterbrook's Limits ofAntitrust was
his instruction about how to weigh Type I versus Type II errors.36 If a
procompetitive behavior is wrongly condemned (Type I error), the adverse
effect-squandered efficiencies-is not limited to the defendant's market
but, because of the precedent created, extends to other markets in which
the condemned practice is or would be utilized.37 Moreover, correcting
the erroneous precedent and resulting welfare loss requires a judicial
decision that overrules the mistaken condemnation. 38 By contrast, if
anticompetitive conduct is wrongly allowed to persist, the result will be
the sort of monopoly pricing that invites entry and may thereby selfcorrect. 39 Accordingly, Easterbrook reasoned, false convictions are
"worse" than false acquittals. 40 And that suggests, he argued, that liability
rules on questionable practices should be calibrated so as to err in the
33. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
34. Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 16 ("The legal system should be designed to minimize the total
costs of (1) anticompetitive practices that escape condemnation; (2) competitive practices that are
condemned or deterred; and (3) the system itself.").
.

35. Voltaire, La Begueule, in 3 RECUEIL DES MEILLEURS CONTES EN VERS 412, 412 (1772)
("[L]e mieux est ennemi du bien. .

36. Easterbrook explained:
A fundamental difficulty facing the court is the incommensurability of the stakes. If the
court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good. Any
other firm that uses the condemned practice faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no
matter the benefits. If the court errs by permitting a deleterious practice, though, the
welfare loss decreases over time. Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices
eventually attract entry. True, this long run may be a long time coming, with loss to society
in the interim. The central purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long run.
But this should not obscure the point: judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are selfcorrecting while erroneous condemnations are not.
Easterbrook, supranote 13, at 2-3.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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direction of allowing anticompetitive acts rather than banning or
discouraging procompetitive ones. 4
The U.S. Department of Justice seemingly endorsed Easterbrook's
incommensurate harms position in its now-abrogated Section 2 Report,
which suggested that exclusionary unilateral conduct not subject to one of
the more tailored liability rules in the Report should be condemned only if
its likely anticompetitive harm would be "substantially disproportionate"
to its likely procompetitive benefit.42
3. The Screening Mechanisms
If the overall goal is to implement antitrust so as to minimize the sum
of error and decision costs, with an understanding that Type I errors
typically impose greater costs than Type II errors, how should courts
proceed? The third key component of Easterbrook's approach was a set
of screening mechanisms designed to help antitrust courts achieve the
overarching objective by filtering out challenges to practices that are likely
to be procompetitive. Specifically, Easterbrook proposed five filters:
1. Market Power. The court should ask whether the defendant (or
group of defendants) has market power. If not, Easterbrook
asserted, the challenged conduct is unlikely to create
anticompetitive harm and should not be condemned. 43
2. Logical Relation Between Profit and Reduced Competition. The
court should ask whether the challenged conduct would increase
the defendant's profits by reducing competition. If the alleged
reduction in competition would reduce the defendant's profits,
there is no need for antitrust to deter the anticompetitive behavior;

41. See id. at 15 ("In which direction should these rules err? For a number of reasons, errors on
the side of excusing questionable practices are preferable."); see also id. ("[T]he economic system
corrects monopoly more readily than it corrects judicial errors.").
42.

See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER

SECTION 2 OF THE

SHERMAN

ACT 45

(2008),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr

/legacy/2009/05/11/236681.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVC3-FRJ5] ("Under the disproportionality test,
conduct that potentially has both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects is anticompetitive under
section 2 if its likely anticompetitive harms substantially outweigh its likely procompetitive
benefits."). The Department of Justice later withdrew the report. See Christine A. Vamey, Assistant
Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks Before the United States Chamber of Commerce: Vigorous
Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era (May 12, 2009), https://wwwjustice.gov/atr/speech
/vigorous-antitrust-enforcement-challenging-era [https://perma.cc/4JG6-U4XC]) ("I have withdrawn
the Section 2 Report by the Department of Justice. Effective May 11, 2009, the Section 2 Report no
longer represents the policy of the Department of Justice with regard to antitrust enforcement under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Report and its conclusions should not be used as guidance by
courts, antitrust practitioners, and the business community.").
43. Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 19-23.
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the market will do so. 4 4 Moreover, if the challenged practice could

enhance the defendant's profits even apart from a reduction in
competition, condemnation of the practice could deter
procompetitive conduct.
3. WidespreadAdoption ofldentical Vertical Practices. For vertical
practices like resale price maintenance (RPM), exclusive dealing,
and tying, the court should ask whether "almost all firms in [the
defendant's] industry use the same vertical restraints."46 The
reason for this filter, Easterbrook said, "is that every one of the
potentially-anticompetitive outcomes of vertical arrangements
depends on the uniformity of the practice."
Easterbrook offered
RPM as an example, observing that the potential anticompetitive
harms from the practice-facilitation of dealer or manufacturer
cartels-can occur only if the practice is widely deployed.4 ' Where
a vertical practice is used by just one or a few competitors in an
industry, Easterbrook reasoned, it is likely employed for
procompetitive ends .49
4. Effect on Output and Market Share. The court should ask whether
the defendant's output and market share are falling.o If the
challenged practice results in a better deal for consumers-perhaps
by enhancing the quality of the defendant's offering by enough to
offset any price increase-then the defendant's output and market
share will grow." By contrast, if the practice is enhancing the
44. Id. at 24 ("Unless there is a link between the antitrust injury and the defendant's profit, there
is no need for judges to impose a sanction. The sanction imposed by the business losses will clear up
the practice in due course.").
45. Id. at 28-29 (explaining how a period of below-cost pricing could enhance the seller's profits
even apart from a reduction in competition and asserting that "an antitrust court should handle cases
such as this by asking whether profits depended on monopoly").
46. Id. at 30.
47. Id.
48. Id. Easterbrook explained:
[R]esale price maintenance (RPM) or territorial restraints can facilitate or enforce a cartel
only if all firms in the industry use identical practices. If Sylvania uses RPM while GE
and Sony do not, the RPM cannot facilitate anyone's cartel. Dealers that want to cheat on
a dealers' cartel will sell more GE sets at reduced prices, [a]nd if practices are not identical
in the manufacturing industry, then RPM cannot facilitate a cartel there, either. The whole
point of a "facilitating practice" is that when everyone does things the same way, this
reduces the number of things the cartel must monitor to control cheating. When everyone
does not do things the same way, nothing can be "facilitated."
Id.
49. Id. at 31 ("Whatever explains a solitary manufacturer's use of RPM, exclusive contracts, ties,
or other practices, the practice cannot be anticompetitive.").
50. Id. ("If arrangements are anticompetitive, the output and market share of those using them
must fall.").
51. Id. ("If [the defendant firm] both increases the price and increases the quality, it may sell
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defendant's market power, its output will fall; the monopolist
enhances its profits by reducing output so as to drive up price.
Thus, Easterbrook reasoned, trends in the defendant's output and
market share can signal whether its conduct is, on balance, pro- or
anti-competitive.52
5. The Identity of the Plaintiff Finally, the court should ask whether
the plaintiff is a customer or a competitor of the defendant.53
Customers benefit from enhanced competition in the defendant's
market, as when a defendant gains a cost- or quality-advantage over
its rivals; customers are harmed by reductions in competition. By
contrast, competitors are injured when a defendant's conduct gives
it a cost- or quality-advantage, and they benefit when market
competition eases.
A customer plaintiff, then, is likely
complaining about reduced competition-antitrust's targetwhereas a competitor plaintiff may be complaining of enhanced
competition or may be seeking to raise the defendant's cost (and
thereby secure its own cost-advantage) by forcing it to defend a
lawsuit. 4 The identity of the complaining party, then, can assist
courts in determining whether a challenged practice is likely proor anti-competitive.
B. Evaluatingthe Approach Today
More than thirty-five years have passed since Easterbook published
The Limits of Antitrust. During that time, there have been some major
developments in the business world, including, among many others, the
advent of the Internet and mobile telephony, the rise of digital social
networks and other digital platforms, and, in the world of finance,
explosive growth in index investing. There have also been significant
advances in economic learning, with scholars gaining a better
understanding of how certain business practices can be pro- and/or anticompetitive. How does Easterbrook's late-twentieth century approach
look in light of twenty-first century market developments and advances in
economic learning?
Easterbrook's overarching objective for antitrust policy decisions
remains fundamentally sound. Since 1984, no developments in market

more or less, depending on whether consumers value the improvement at more than the cost. . .. If
its sales increase despite the higher price, we know that the change was worth the higher price, and
then some, to consumers.").
52. See id.
53. Id. at 33-39.
54. As Easterbook observed, the costs of antitrust litigation are usually significantly greater for
defendants than for plaintiffs. Id. at 34.
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structures or economic learning have altered the mixed-bag nature of the
behavior antitrust regulates, the consequent inevitability of error and
decision costs, or the fact that efforts to reduce one set of costs will drive
up another. Scholars have progressed in their understanding of the
circumstances under which particular behaviors may occasion
anticompetitive harm (or create procompetitive benefits), and that new
knowledge may allow courts to restructure doctrines so as to reduce costs
overall." But antitrust remains an inherently limited enterprise, and
Easterbrook's overarching prescription for maximizing welfare in light of
those limits-craft policies to minimize the sum of error and decision
costs-remains as wise as ever.
Easterbrook's instruction on the incommensurate harms from Type I
versus Type II errors has fared less well. The claim that false convictions
are systematically worse than false acquittals is too categorical.5 6 It is true

that many anticompetitive harms are self-correcting. Collusion among
competitors, for example, is difficult to maintain and invites entry.
Economic learning has revealed, though, that some forms of exclusionary
conduct do not automatically self-correct. For example, some actions by
a dominant firm-e.g., exclusive dealing that forecloses a manufacturer's
competitors from a substantial proportion of available distribution
outlets-can prevent rivals from growing enough to attain the scale
economies that would enable them to underprice the dominant firm.57
Indeed, in markets characterized by large economies of scale and
network effects (e.g., digital social networking, computer operating
systems), entry and underpricing may be particularly unlikely.58
Easterbrook's point about incommensurate harms should thus be
somewhat softened: in deciding whether to tilt the liability rule in favor of
permitting questionable conduct, courts should ask whether any resulting
market power would be transitory (as with collusion) or durable (as with
some exclusionary practices in some types of markets). Sometimes a prodefendant bias will be appropriate, but not always.59
Like his instruction on incommensurate harms, Easterbrook's

55. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889-94 (2007)
(summarizing economic learning on competitive effects of minimum resale price maintenance).
56.

See generally Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75

(2010) (arguing that the current role of error analysis in United States antitrust law is too simplistic).
57.

See Joshua D. Wright, Moving Beyond Naive ForeclosureAnalysis, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV.

1163, 1166-71 (2012).
58. See Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 80 ("Recent experience suggests that monopolistic
behavior may not always be eliminated by the market in a timely fashion, especially where powerful
network effects are present.").
59. Id. at 104-26 (arguing that Type I errors are not always worse than Type II errors and that
whether liability rules should be calibrated to favor Type II errors depends on, inter alia, the likely
durability of the resulting harms).

20201

THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST IN THE 21ST CENTURY

1107

screening mechanisms for filtering out procompetitive behaviors require
some adjustment. The first two screens-the requirement that defendants
possess market power and that the challenged conduct enhance their
profits by reducing competition-have fared well and continue to enjoy
support in the case law.6 0
The fifth-weeding out competitor
complaints-remains useful in some contexts. In challenges to horizontal
mergers, for example, complaints by rivals should raise yellow flags, since
competitors benefit from reduced competition and are injured when their
rivals become more efficient. Developments in economic learning,
though, suggest that the mere fact that the complainant is a competitor does
not always signal that the challenged practice is procompetitive. We now
understand that many exclusionary practices (e.g., exclusive dealing
arrangements involving substantial market foreclosure) may injure
competition by raising rivals' costs. 6' Because such practices hurt both
consumers and competitors, the fact that a competitor is complaining,
standing alone, does not indicate that the challenged practice is
procompetitive. The fifth filter is thus useful in some situations but not
others. A useful revision would be to say that behaviors drawing
competitor complaints but no consumer complaints is likely
procompetitive.
Easterbrook's third and fourth filters have not stood the test of time.
The third, which eliminates challenges to vertical restraints that are not in
widespread use throughout the market at issue, rests on a premise that we
now understand to be faulty. According to Easterbrook, "[t]he rationale
for this [widespread use] filter is that every one of the potentially anticompetitive outcomes of vertical arrangements depends on the uniformity
of the practice." 62 We now know, though, that this is not true. A dominant
producer's exclusive dealing contract that forecloses its rivals from a
substantial proportion of sales opportunities and thereby holds them below
minimum efficient scale can injure competition even if no other producers

60. With respect to the first (market power) filter, monopolization claims under Sherman Act
Section 2 still require that the defendant possess monopoly power. See Diaz Aviation Corp. v. Airport
Aviation Servs., Inc., 716 F.3d 256, 265 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). And the existence of market power is typically required for liability based
on concerted conduct that is not per se illegal. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 897 (2007) (observing that market power is necessary for anticompetitive harm,
and thus liability, from RPM); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001) (assessing
defendants' market power in considering whether information exchange was illegal under the rule of
reason). The antitrust injury requirement helps implement the second filter, for it results in the
dismissal of actions in which the complained of harm does not stem from a reduction in competition.
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-89 (1977).
61. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: RaisingRivals'
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 254-58 (1986).

62. Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 30.
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in the market engage in similar arrangements. 63 A single firm's tie-in that
results in substantial foreclosure in the tied product market can similarly
impair competition in that market. 4 Even RPM, the vertical restraint
Easterbrook referenced, can impair competition despite not being widely
utilized. For example, as the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., a dominant manufacturer
can use RPM (with its guaranteed retail mark-up) to induce distributors to
exclude rival brands, raising rivals' distribution costs and potentially
driving them below minimum efficient scale.6 ' And a dominant retailer
can protect itself from being undersold by more efficient retailers by
insisting that the producers whose brands it carries impose RPM. Neither
of these types of anticompetitive harm from RPM requires that the practice
be employed by all or most of the producers in a market.
Easterbrook's fourth filter-which screens out actions against
defendants whose output and market share are not dropping-is similarly
problematic.
This screen may be appropriate when the alleged
anticompetitive harm is collusion-some kind of agreement to restrain
output so as to increase price and enhance profits. But if the defendant has
engaged in unreasonably exclusionary conduct to drive rivals from the
market or raise their costs, it will grow its market share and may well see
its output rise as well, particularly if market demand is increasing. Thus,
in actions alleging unreasonably exclusionary conduct, courts should not
dismiss claims solely because the defendant's market share and output are
nsing.

II. FOUR ADDITIONAL SCREENS FOR THE CURRENT ERA
In addition to softening Easterbrook's incommensurate harms
principle and revising or eliminating some of his particular screening
mechanisms, courts attempting to optimize antitrust's effectiveness in the
current antitrust moment should adopt four additional screens. Although
the first of these was implicit in Easterbrook's analysis, he did not spell it
out explicitly, likely for reasons discussed below. The remaining screens
differ somewhat from Easterbrook's original filters in that they are not
aimed at discerning whether challenged conduct is procompetitive or
anticompetitive but are instead designed to ensure that antitrust
intervention is likely to be welfare-enhancing.
They thus reflect

63. See Wright, supra note 57, at 1166-71 (discussing economics of market foreclosure).
64. See Thomas A. Lambert, AppropriateLiability Rules for Tying and Bundled Discounting, 72

OHIO ST. L.J. 909, 922-23 (2011); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the
Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARv. L. REv. 397, 413-14 (2009).
65. 551 U.S. at 893-94.
66. Id.
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Easterbrook's well-founded concern about Type I error costs.
A.

Does the ChallengedPractice Entail Consumer Harm?

-

An initial twenty-first century filter-no imposition of antitrust
liability absent consumer harm-would not have seemed worth
mentioning when Easterbrook authored his 1984 article. In Robert Bork's
influential 1978 book, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War with Itself
Bork purported to show that the purpose of the Sherman Act-as revealed
in its legislative history-was to enhance consumer welfare, which Bork
equated with maximizing efficiency (or, more specifically, minimizing the
sum of allocative and productive inefficiencies).6 7 While Bork's reading
of legislative history has been severely questioned-if not discredited 6 8
his effort to focus the antitrust laws on consumer welfare met with success.
In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed the antitrust laws to be a
"consumer welfare prescription,"69 and ever since, the prevailing view
among courts has been that antitrust's sole end is consumer welfare, a view
known as the "consumer welfare standard" (CWS). 70 It is thus no surprise
that in 1984, Easterbrook did not propose a screening mechanism to weed
out antitrust actions aimed at some other objective besides consumer
welfare.
Times have changed. Today, numerous commentators contend that
the CWS prevents antitrust from remedying significant social harms that
it could-and historically did-address.
One such harm, these
67.

ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50-89, 116-

29 (1st ed. 1978).
68.

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989)

(observing that "Bork's analysis of the legislative history was strained [and] heavily governed by his
own ideological agenda" and that "[n]ot a single statement in the legislative history comes close to
stating the conclusions that Bork drew"); Robert Lande, Wealth TransfersAs the Originaland Primary
Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 150 (1982)

(examining antitrust legislative history and concluding that Congress's primary concern was not
allocative efficiency but rather wealth transfers away from consumers and to monopolists); Tim Wu,
After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The "Protection of Competition" Standard in Practice,
ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2018, at 1, 4, https://www.competitionpolicyintemational.com/wp-

content/uploads/2018/04/CPI-Wu.pdf [hereinafter Wu, After Consumer Welfare].
69. Reiterv. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting BORK, supra note 67, at 66).
70.

Kenneth Heyer, Consumer Welfare and the Legacy ofRobert Bork, 57 J.L. & ECON. S19, S32

(2014) ("On the question of welfare standards for antitrust, however, it is harder to dispute the fact
that Bork not only won the battle, he also won the war.").
71.

See generallyWU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 7; Wu, After Consumer Welfare, supra

note 68 (arguing for the adoption of a "protection of competition" standard in lieu of the consumer
welfare standard); see also LinaM. Kahn,Amazon'sAntitrustParadox,126 YALEL.J. 710,737(2017)

("[T]he undue focus on consumer welfare is misguided. It betrays legislative history, which reveals
that Congress passed antitrust laws to promote a host of political economic ends-including our
interests as workers, producers, entrepreneurs, and citizens."); MARSHALL STEINBAUM & MAURICE E.
STUCKE, ROOSEVELT INST., THE EFFECTIVE COMPETITION STANDARD:

A NEW STANDARD FOR
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commentators say, is buyer market power. 72 When purchasers of labor or
inputs face little competition from other potential buyers, they can drive
wages down and input prices below competitive levels. This not only
harms laborers and input sellers, but it also results in allocative
inefficiencies as high-quality laborers and input providers, denied
competitive prices, cut back on their offerings or divert them to lessvaluable uses. These social harms do not register under the CWSaccording to critics of the standard-because driving prices of labor and
other inputs below competitive levels does tend to lower output prices,
providing an immediate benefit to consumers.73
CWS critics also assert that the standard is incapable of addressing
innovation harms that, unlike higher prices, are difficult to quantify and
prove. 4 They say that dominant technology platforms like Google,
Amazon, Facebook, and Apple threaten innovation for a number of
reasons. 7 Their efficiencies have driven out small businesses, which tend
to be particularly inventive.
Operating in highly concentrated markets,
these dominant firms face little pressure to innovate so as to avoid losing
business to rivals. And they are well-positioned to cut back on their own
inventive efforts and either usurp others' innovations or buy out the
innovators at paltry prices. 77 Because they collect extensive data on their

ANTITRUST 1 (2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-Effective
-Competition-Standard-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XG6-DHX5] ("The consumer welfare standard
fails to define 'welfare' and ignores adverse effects on workers, suppliers, quality, and innovation. It
is not only ambiguous, but it is also inadequate to the task of preserving competition throughout the
supply chain, in the labor market, and in the economy as a whole.").
72. See, e.g., Jose Azar, loana Marinescu & Marshall I. Steinbaum, LaborMarket Concentration
1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24147, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers
/w24147.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LAD-YUSN]; Carl T. Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse
ofBigness and the FailureofAntitrust, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 10 (2015).
73.

See, e.g., MARSHALL STEINBAUM, ERIC HARRIS BERNSTEIN & JOHN STURM, ROOSEVELT

INST., POWERLESS: How LAX ANTITRUST AND CONCENTRATED MARKET POWER RIG THE ECONOMY

AGAINST AMERICAN WORKERS, CONSUMERS, AND COMMUNITIES 32 (2018), https://rooseveltinstitute

.

("[C]onsumer
[https://perma.cc/4EM9-H2EB]
.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Powerless.pdf
welfare paradigm ignores upstream 'monopsony'-the power a firm can wield over its suppliers,
including suppliers of labor. .
74. Id. at 26-29.
75. See id. at 7-8 ("In many instances, technological developments-free of regulatory
oversight-have exacerbated these problems, allowed companies like Google, Facebook, and Amazon
to achieve market dominance by collecting reams of data and acting as an all-knowing middleman
between customers and upstream suppliers.").
76. See, e.g., Barry C. Lynn & Phillip Longman, Who Broke America's Jobs Machine? Why
Creeping Consolidation Is Crushing American Livelihoods., WASH. MONTHLY (2010),

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1003.lynn-longman.html [https://perma.cc/8BBQ
-B6DY] ("It is ... widely agreed that small businesses tend to be more inventive, producing more
patents per employee, for example, than do larger firms.").
77. See, e.g., Steinbaum, Bernstein & Sturm, supra note 73, at 7-8 ("[R]ather than investing in
research and development (R&D) to generate innovative products, corporations have relied on lax
merger regulation to buy out competitors, or they have employed a litany of anticompetitive practices
to prevent them from entering markets in the first place.").

20201

THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST IN THE 21ST CENTURY

1111

users' Internet activity-both on and off their platforms-they can
identify what innovations are most valuable and pursue only those
opportunities. 78 If the valuable innovations are not subject to intellectual
property protections, they can simply copy them; or, if copying is illegal
or infeasible, they can purchase the innovator. 79 Many times, they can
gain bargaining leverage over a buyout target by threatening to
disadvantage the innovator's offering on their own platforms (e.g., by
making it less visible to platform users, hiding favorable reviews, etc.).80
These factors, CWS critics say, have collectively created a "kill zone" in
which venture capitalists will not invest out of fear that any valuable
innovations will be appropriated or purchased on the cheap.81
The concern that the CWS cannot address innovation harms is a subset
of the broader concern that it is incapable of policing anticompetitive harm
in zero-price markets.82 Because antitrust enforcement occurs in courts
and not in expert regulatory agencies, evidence of consumer welfare
effects must be accessible to and easily processed by juries and generalist,
nonexpert judges. As a practical matter, evidence concerning short-term
price effects tends to be most salient to these factfinders.83 With firms like
Facebook and Google, which allow consumers to access their services for
free, showing consumer harm poses a challenge. Even if a court adopts

78. See, e.g., Hal Singer, Inside Tech's "Kill Zone": How to Deal With the Threat to Edge
Innovation Posed by Multi-Sided Platforms, PRO-MARKET (Nov. 21, 2018), https://promarket.org

/inside-tech-kill-zone/ [https://perma.cc/C488-NUS4] [hereinafter Singer, Kill Zone] ("Dominant tech
platforms can also exploit the vast amount of user data made available only to them by monitoring
what their users do both on and off their platforms, and then appropriating the best-performing ideas,
functionality, and non-patentable products pioneered by independent providers.").
79. See, e.g., id. (discussing the trend in big tech for dominant firms to discriminate against, or
vertically integrate with, innovative independent content providers); see also infra notes 80-81 and
accompanying text.
80.

See, e.g., Lina M. Kahn, The Separation ofPlatforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV.

973, 992 (2019) ("There are numerous means by which Amazon can disfavor any particular merchant:
It can suspend or shut down accounts overnight, withhold merchant funds, change page displays, and
throttle or block favorable reviews."); Hal Singer, How to Stop Amazon from Swallowing the Internet,

FORBES (Jan. 28, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2019/01/28/how-to
-stop-amazon-from-swallowing-the-internet/#6b611fcc3664 [https://perma.cc/932F-TV8U].
81. See Singer, Kill Zone, supra note 78 (describing the "kill zone" as an area "around the tech
giants in which startups are squashed"); see also Into the Danger Zone: American Tech Giants Are
Making Life Tough for Startups, THE ECONOMIST (June 2, 2018), https://www.economist.com

/business/2018/06/02/american-tech-giants-are-making-life-tough-for-startups
[https://perma.cc
/A3GP-GVJU] ("Venture capitalists ... now talk of a 'kill-zone' around the giants. Once a young
firm enters, it can be extremely difficult to survive. Tech giants try to squash startups by copying
them, or they pay to scoop them up early to eliminate a threat.").
82. See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-PriceMarkets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149,

198 (2015) ("The narrow-minded focus on price competition exhibited throughout much of antitrust
law's developmental history has yielded analytical frameworks suited only for use in positive-price
product markets.").
83. See generally Kevin Caves & Hal Singer, When the Econometrician Shrugged: Identifying
and Plugging Gaps in the Consumer-Welfare Standard, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 395 (2018)

(discussing difficulty of proving and measuring non-price harms).
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the view that consumers effectively pay for free services by providing the
firms with valuable data, proving and quantifying an "overcharge" can be
difficult. 4
CWS critics also assert that the standard's focus on short-term price
effects can immunize structural developments (high market concentration,
etc.) that cause long-run consumer harm.' Criticizing the CWS as applied
to Amazon's low pricing, for example, Lina Kahn writes:
Focusing primarily on price and output undermines effective antitrust
enforcement by delaying intervention until market power is being
actively exercised, and largely ignoring whether and how it is being
acquired. In other words, pegging anticompetitive harm to high prices
and/or lower output-while disregarding the market structure and
competitive process that give rise to this market power-restricts
intervention to the moment when a company has already acquired
86
sufficient dominance to distort competition.
Finally, a number of commentators-dubbed "Neo-Brandeisians"
after Justice Louis Brandeis's essay, A Curse of Bigness87-contend that
the CWS prevents antitrust from addressing non-buyer/seller harms that
result from having firms that are just too big. For example, highly efficient
giant businesses can eliminate less efficient smaller rivals that provide
employment opportunities and are the lifeblood of many communities. 8
By generating massive profits for their managers and largest stockholders,
giant businesses exacerbate wealth inequality.89 And because their
economic might gives them excessive influence over government
officials, their existence tends to undermine democratic values. 90
In light of the harms purportedly left unaddressed by the CWS-buyer
market power, reduced innovation, harms in zero-price markets, long-term
consumer harm from increased concentration, job losses, community
impairment, wealth inequality, harm to democracy-many contemporary
commentators contend that the CWS is myopic.91 They would not make
84. See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-PriceMarkets: Applications, 94 WASH. U. L. REV.

49, 83-84 (2016) (discussing difficulty of assessing damages in zero-price markets).
85.

See Kahn, Amazon 'sAntitrustParadox, supra note 71, at 738-3 9.

86. Id. at 738.
87. Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, HARPER'S WKLY., Jan. 10, 1914, at 18, 18. See
generally LOUIS. D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D.

BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934).
88. See, e.g., Lynn & Longman, supra note 76.
89. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Antitrust and Inequality: The Problem of Super-Firms, 63
ANTITRUST BULL. 104, 109-10 (2018).
90. See generallyWU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 7.
91. See, e.g., The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated or a Harbor in a Sea of

2020]

THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST IN THE 21ST CENTURY

1113

consumer harm a necessary condition to antitrust intervention and would
replace the CWS with some sort of public interest approach that would
permit antitrust intervention in the pursuit of other values. 92
Such a move would be misguided. As an initial matter, jettisoning the
CWS is unnecessary, as each of the aforementioned harms is either
cognizable under the CWS or better addressed, if at all, by a body of law
other than antitrust. 93
It is well established, for example, that the CWS reaches harms
stemming from buyer market power. 94 Properly understood, the standard
focuses on harms not just to "final consumers" but also to trading parties
on the other side of the market from the defendant. 95 The term "consumer"
is used in the CWS because most antitrust defendants are sellers accused
of exercising market power to cause their buyers to pay an excessive price
or accept inferior quality. However, when a buyer possesses market power
and exercises it to influence its suppliers, any diminution in prices paid to
sellers is also considered "consumer" harm for purposes of the CWS. 9 6
Moreover, even if antitrust required harm to actual final consumers,
exercises of buyer market power would still create cognizable harms: by
artificially lowering input or labor prices, buyers exercising market power
drive high-quality inputs and laborers from the market, reducing the
quality of their output to the detriment of final consumers. Accordingly,
&

Doubt?: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary: Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition,

ConsumerRights, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Barry C. Lynn, Executive Director, Open Markets
Institute); Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America 's Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR.
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 131, 132 (2018).
92. See K. Sabeel Rahman & Lina Kahn, Restoring Competition in the U.S. Economy, in
UNTAMED:

How

To CHECK CORPORATE,

FINANCIAL, AND

MONOPOLY POWER 18, 23

(Nell

Abernathy, Mike Konczal & Kathryn Milani eds., 2016), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content
/uploads/2016/06/Untamed-Final-Single-Pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/3 C84-LMER]; Sen. Elizabeth
Warren, Keynote Remarks at New America's Open Markets Program Event: Reigniting Competition
in the American Economy (June 29, 2016), https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/03/09/reigniting
-competition-in-the-american-economy-june-29-2016/ [https://perma.cc/4BNF-VLAX] (expressing
support for proposal "adopting a public interest standard for [antitrust] enforcement actions").
93.

See JOE KENNEDY, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., WHY THE CONSUMER WELFARE

STANDARD SHOULD REMAIN THE BEDROCK OF ANTITRUST POLICY 9-17 (2018), https://docs.house

.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20181212/108774/HHRG-115-JU05-20181212-SDO04.pdf [https://perma.cc
/QW56-JMNP].
94.

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE

DAME L. REv. 583, 628-36 (2018) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Antitrust Movement] (explaining how
CWS addresses buyer market power and labor market monopsony).
95.

Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, HorizontalMergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of

Proof 127 YALEL.J. 1996, 2000-01 (2018) ("[A]pplying the 'consumer welfare' standard means that
a merger is judged to be anticompetitive if it disrupts the competitive process and harms trading parties
on the other side of the market."); see also id. at 2001 n. 14 (observing that trading partners "may be
final consumers or businesses purchasing intermediate goods" or "suppliers such as workers or farmers
who are harmed by the loss of competition when two large buyers merge").
96. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Movement, supra note 94, at 634-35 ("For the purpose of
analyzing wage suppression agreements, the worker stands in the same position on the sell side as the
consumer does on the buy side.").
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a number of recent court decisions and enforcement actions, all purporting
to implement the CWS, have invoked antitrust to prevent buyer market
power. 97

Reduced innovation, non-price harms in zero-price markets, and
adverse long-term effects on consumers are also cognizable under the
CWS. The consumer-welfare-focused Horizontal Merger Guidelines, for
example, explicitly direct the antitrust enforcement agencies to consider
potential innovation harms when evaluating proposed mergers,98 and the
agencies regularly pursue cases on the basis of harms to innovation. 99
Non-price harms associated with free services are reachable under the
CWS because all aspects of the transaction-price, quality, accompanying
services, etc.-are relevant to the overall surplus consumers enjoy. 0 0 For
this reason, antitrust enforcers have recently affirmed that market powerinduced harms to consumer privacy, a matter of service quality, are
cognizable under the CWS.' 0 And, of course, long-term adverse price
97. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing dismissal of antitrust
claim based on employer information exchange that could have involved exercise of market power to
suppress wages); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Requires Six High
Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 24,
2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-tech-companies-stop
-entering-anticompetitive-employee [https://perma.cc/6PNK-3R59]; Jeff John Roberts, Tech Workers
Will Get Average of $5,770 Under FinalAnti-Poaching Settlement, FORTUNE (Sept. 3, 2015, 9:40

AM), http://fortune.com/2015/09/03/koh-anti-poach-order/; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Justice Department Requires Knorr and Wabtec to Terminate Unlawful Agreements Not to Compete
for Employees (Apr. 3, 2018), https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-knorr-and
-wabtec-terminate-unlawful-agreements-not-compete [https://perma.cc/VX62-Y3CG].
98. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 6.4
(2010) (agencies may consider whether a proposed merger is "likely to diminish innovation
competition by encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the level that would
prevail in the absence of the merger").
99.

See Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Provides a More ReasonableRegulatory Framework Than

Net Neutrality 11 (Geo. Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 17-35 2017), https://papers.ssm.com
/sol3/abstractid=3020068 [https://perma.cc/F4RG-GH5K] ("Between 2004 and 2014, the FTC
challenged 164 mergers and alleged harm to innovation in 54 of them.").
100. In applying the CWS to abrogate the rule of per se illegality for minimum resale price
maintenance (RPM), the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that the standard is not exclusively pricefocused. See Leegin Creative LeatherProds., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890-95 (2007). While
minimum RPM typically raises consumer prices, the Court observed that the practice is nevertheless
frequently procompetitive because it induces services that consumers value by more than the
incremental price increase. Id. at 890-92, 895. In other words, quality effects may trump price effects
under the CWS.
101. The U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division recently explained:
The goal of antitrust law is to ensure that firms compete through superior pricing,
innovation, or quality. Price is therefore only one dimension of competition, and non-price
factors like innovation and quality are especially important in zero-price markets.
Like other features that make a service appealing to a particular consumer, privacy is
an important dimension of quality. For example, robust competition can spur companies
to offer more or better privacy protections. Without competition, a dominant firm can more
easily reduce quality-such as by decreasing privacy protections-without losing a
significant number of users.
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effects should always be part of the inquiry under the CWS; to the extent
they have not been, the standard has been misapplied.1 0 2
The non-buyer/seller harms emphasized by the Neo-Brandeisiansjob losses, community impairment, wealth inequality, harms to
democracy-are better addressed by bodies of law other than antitrust, or
perhaps left unremedied.1 03 Wealth inequality, for example, is better
handled through tax and redistribution schemes; 0 4 harms to democracy,
by campaign finance rules and restrictions on lobbying (and, most
fundamentally, by limiting government so that it cannot be used to procure
private advantages for politically connected firms). 0 5 Job losses and
harms to communities from the failure of smaller, less efficient businesses
may be somewhat mitigated by job-training programs, community
investments, and the relocation of government agencies to economically
depressed areas. 0 6 At the end of the day, though, obsolescence is a
consequence of economic development; there will always be some losses
when new and better displaces old and less good.1o' Using antitrust to
protect economic laggards is sure to reduce welfare in the long run. 0 In
the end, then, none of the harms emphasized by CWS critics justifies
abandoning the standard in favor of an approach that would pursue
multiple goals.
Not only is it unnecessary to abandon the CWS in favor of some sort
of public interest standard, doing so would have adverse consequences for
consumers and for the rule of law. We know this from experience. During
the early- and mid-twentieth century, courts embraced multiple goals for
antitrust.1 09 They often interpreted the law to promote consumer welfare
by encouraging competition so as to lower prices and enhance quality."1 0
But, in this effort to encourage competition, courts sometimes imposed
liability in the absence of final-consumer harm-even in the face of
Makan Delrahim, U.S. Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., "Blind[ing] Me With Science": Antitrust,
Data, and Digital Markets, Remarks at Harvard Law School & Competition Policy International
Conference on "Challenges to Antitrust in a Changing Economy" (Nov. 8, 2019), https://
wwwjustice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attomey-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-harvardlaw-school-competition [https://perma.cc/47TL-DFV5].
102. See Kennedy, supra note 93, at 9 ("[T]he consumer welfare standard allows regulators and
courts to focus on long-term changes. It just requires a sound economic analysis that shows the
probability of market power at some later date.").
103. Id. at 14-19.
104. Id. at 6.
105. Id. at 15-17.
106. Id. at 18-19.
107. Id. at 19.
108. Id. at 18-19.
109. See Joshua D. Wright, Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick & Jan M. Rybnicek, Requiem for a
Paradox: The DubiousRise and Inevitable Fall ofHipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 300-01

(2019) (discussing multi-goaled approach of twentieth century antitrust).
110. Id. at 300.
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obvious final-consumer benefit-simply to protect smaller firms from

larger, more efficient rivals."'
In Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld a finding of harm to competition when Continental
Baking, a large, efficient firm, entered a market and underpriced Utah Pie,
a smaller but locally dominant rival.11 2 The Court did so even though the
Utah Pie was able to cut its own prices, grow its output, and continue
earning profits (albeit at lower margins) on each sale." 3 Reinstating a jury
verdict in favor of Utah Pie, which had been forced to cut its prices in
response to Continental's pricing strategies, the Court concluded that the
jury could have found the requisite harm to competition because "a
competitor who is forced to reduce his price to a new all-time low in a
market of declining prices will in time feel the financial pinch and will be
a less effective competitive force." 4 Thus, consumer concerns could be
paramount in antitrust cases-unless the court decides to eschew
consumer benefit to protect a less efficient rival.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. UnitedStates,"' the Court all but admitted that
it could pick and choose whether to put consumers or competitors first.
Having conceded that the merger under review could enhance the merged
firm's productive efficiency, the Court wrote:
Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain operations are
beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered unlawful by
the mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely affected. It
is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot
fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these
competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give
effect to that decision."

6

As Robert Bork aptly observed, "No matter how many times you read
it, that passage states: Although mergers are not rendered unlawful by the
mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely affected, we
must recognize that mergers are unlawful when small independent stores

111. Id. ("[C]ourts viewed the role of antitrust as serving various-often conflicting and even
anticompetitive-socio-political goals.").
112. Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 687-89 (1967); see also id. at 698
(describing Continental's innovative method of processing fruit to make frozen pies).
113. Id. at 689-90.
114. Id. at 699-700.
115. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
116. Id. at 344.
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may be adversely affected."" 7 Under such an approach, a court could
allow a merger that would benefit consumers by enhancing productive
efficiency (if the court followed the second and third sentences in the
passage above), or it could choose to block the merger (if it followed
sentences four through seven). Such leeway naturally trickled down to the
enforcement agencies, which could then articulate grounds for challenging
just about any businesses' conduct by emphasizing its adverse effects on
either consumers or competitors.
With enforcers and courts free to pick and choose among antitrust's
multiple goals in order to condemn or acquit virtually any business
behavior, antitrust became less a body of law and more an exercise of raw
political power. Bork compared it to the sheriff of a frontier town: "he did
not sift the evidence, distinguish between suspects, and solve crimes, but
merely walked the main street and every so often pistol-whipped a few
people.""" Even a U.S. Supreme Court justice admitted that antitrust had
become arbitrary and unprincipled. Dissenting in United States v. Von 's
Grocery Co.-a decision that condemned a grocery store merger that
generated obvious efficiencies and resulted in a merged firm with a paltry
7.5% market sharell 9-Justice
Potter Stewart confessed: "The sole
consistency that I can find is that in litigation under [Clayton Act Section]
7, the Government always wins."120
When the government always wins, winning the favor of government
officials becomes paramount. For that reason, abandonment of the CWS
in favor of a multi-goaled public interest standard would promote
politicization of the antitrust enforcement agencies.121 It would also
ensure that consumers, widely dispersed and difficult to organize,
regularly lose out to firms and organized interest groups, even when the
total harms to consumers from an enforcement decision exceed the
benefits to the organized interests promoting it. When the benefits of a
government action are concentrated on a well-organized few while the
costs are spread over a widely dispersed group, government officials tend
to defer to the few over the many, even when the total benefits to the few
are less than the total costs to the many.1 22
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

BORK, supra note 67, at 216.
Id. at 6.
384 U.S. 270, 272-79 (1966).
Id. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See Elyse Dorsey, Jan M. Rybnicek & Joshua D. Wright, HipsterAntitrust Meets Public

Choice Economics: The Consumer Welfare Standard,Rule ofLaw, andRent Seeking 3-7 (Geo. Mason

Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-20, 2018), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=3165192 [https://perma.cc/6QJ8-ERC8].
122. Id. at 4 ("Although such decisions result in net losses to society, private interests can
successfully extract these rents because the benefits are concentrated among a small number of
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A multi-goaled antitrust approach is not needed to address harms
emphasized by CWS critics. Adopting such an approach would politicize
antitrust enforcement decisions and would likely reduce overall social
welfare. Courts should thus resist calls to jettison the CWS, and a
demonstration of actual or likely consumer harm should remain a prerequisite to antitrust intervention.
B. Has the Defendant Extended Market Power, or Just ExercisedIt to
Extract GreaterSurplus?
Consumer harm from market power is a necessary, but insufficient,
condition for antitrust intervention. A second prerequisite to intervention
should be an extension of market power by the defendant.
Two types of antitrust-related business behavior can harm
consumers.1 23 The first is an exercise of market power, which is the ability
of a firm lacking competitive constraints to enhance its profits by raising
its price above its incremental cost.1 24 When a firm exercises market
power to charge supracompetitive prices, it extracts for itself more of the
surplus, or wealth, created by its transactions with its customers.1 2 5 Firms

organized individuals while the costs are diffused across numerous consumers who individually lack
the incentive to organize and protect themselves.").
123. See Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Extraction vs. Extension: The Basisfor Formulating
Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 285, 285 (2008).
124. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 80 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY] ("Market

power is a firm's ability to deviate profitably from marginal cost pricing."). A firm competing in a
market in which there are many good substitutes for the firm's product will possess little market power;
if it tries to raise price substantially above its incremental cost, it will lose sales to competitors who
charge prices closer to their costs. Competition will thus drive prices down near the level of cost. Id.
at 81. An absence of suitable substitutes for a firm's product, however, may enable the firm to enhance
its profits by raising its price above its incremental cost. Marginal consumers-those that attach the
lowest value to the firm's offering-may stop buying the product in response to the price increase.
But consumers who attach a greater value to the product (infra-marginal consumers) will continue to
buy it as long as the inflated price is less than the value they attach to the product and there is no
competing product that offers them greater net value. If the increased profits from consumers who
continue to buy at the inflated price exceed the lost profits on foregone sales to marginal consumers,
the price increase will be profitable. The loss of value from transactions that would have occurred but
for the price increase (i.e., from sales to marginal consumers) is an inefficiency-a "deadweight loss"
in social welfare-occasioned by supracompetitive pricing. See id. at 12-14, 19-20 (explaining
monopoly pricing and deadweight loss).
125. Every voluntary transaction between a buyer and seller involves the creation of surplus
(wealth), which is split between the buyer and seller. The total surplus is the difference between the
subjective value the buyer attaches to the thing being sold and the seller's cost of producing and selling
the item. The seller's surplus is the difference between the price the seller collects and the cost of
making and selling the unit sold; the buyer's is the amount by which she subjectively values the unit,
less the price she must pay to obtain it. See id. at 4-5. Surplus "extraction" occurs when one party
usurps for itself a greater proportion of the wealth created by the transaction with its counterparty. See
Carlton & Heyer, supra note 123, at 293-97.

20201

THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST IN THE 21ST CENTURY

1119

may also cause consumer harm by extending their market power. 126When
nominal competitors agree to act in concert to raise prices-e.g., in a naked
price-fixing conspiracy-their collusive agreement creates market power
that would not otherwise exist. When two firms merge to create a
monopoly, or in a manner that substantially increases the likelihood of
future oligopolistic coordination, they similarly extend market power.
When a firm engages in unreasonably exclusionary conduct that drives its
rivals from the market or somehow raises their costs so as to render them
less formidable competitors, its market power grows.
While both surplus extraction and market power extension can
occasion consumer harm, there should be no antitrust liability absent the
latter.1 2 7 One reason for this is practical. If surplus extraction involving
no extension of market power were illegal, adjudicators and business
planners would confront an intractable question: How much extraction is
permitted? Every instance of supracompetitive pricing by any firm with
any quantum of market power transfers some surplus from consumers to
the producer. 128 It would be impracticable for antitrust to forbid all such
surplus extraction, so courts would have to draw some sort of line. Given
the difficulty of doing so in any nonarbitrary fashion, courts have wisely
ruled that the mere charging of monopoly prices is not an antitrust
violation, despite the consumer harm from surplus extraction.1 29
A more important reason for immunizing mere surplus extraction from
antitrust liability is that doing so promotes dynamic efficiency. 30 First,
the prospect of earning supernormal profits due to a lack of competition
motivates entrepreneurs to develop unique products and services. As the
U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged, "[t]he opportunity to charge
monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts 'business
acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation
and economic growth."i 3 i
In addition to motivating innovation, the supracompetitive profits

126. E.g., Carlton & Heyer, supra note 123, at 298 (describing market power extension). Note
that Carlton & Heyer are concerned solely with single-firm conduct that extends market power. But
collusion does so as well: Competitors as a group gain market power when they agree not to compete.
127. Id. at 293 ("[A]ntitrust policy could be simplified and, in our view, improved if conduct
falling squarely into the extraction category was immune from antitrust attack.").
128.

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 19

(2005) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE] (explaining how an exercise of

market power transfers surplus from consumers to the producer).
129. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
("The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is
not ... unlawful. . .. "); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447-48 (2009)
("Simply possessing monopoly power and charging monopoly prices does not violate § 2 [of the
Sherman Act] . . . .").

130. See Carlton & Heyer, supranote 123, at 287-88.
131.

Verizon Commcns, 540 U.S. at 407.
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gained through surplus extraction often enable innovation by funding
research and development efforts.13 2 A glance at the top global spenders
on research and development (R&D) reveals that most (eleven of fifteen)
are either technology firms derided by many as monopolistic (#1 Amazon,
#2 Alphabet/Google, #5 Intel, #6 Microsoft, #7 Apple, and #14 Facebook)
or pharmaceutical companies whose patent protections insulate them from
competition and allow them to charge supracompetitive prices for their
products (#8 Roche, #9 Johnson & Johnson, #10 Merck, #12 Novartis, and
#15 Pfizer).' 33 This should come as no surprise. Firms that cannot extract
surplus-those forced by competition to charge prices near incremental
cost-have no money to spend on R&D. 3 4
Because the static
inefficiencies (deadweight losses) occasioned by mere surplus
extraction l5 may be dwarfed by the dynamic efficiencies that result from
rewarding and financing innovation, antitrust should not forbid practices
that extract surplus without also extending market power.13 6
This runs counter to a number of recent proposals to condemn mere
surplus extraction under the antitrust laws. Harry First, for example, has
argued that simple monopoly pricing may constitute an antitrust
violation. 3 7
Maintaining that "excessive pricing could satisfy the
monopolistic conduct requirement" of Sherman Act Section 2,138 he
contends that courts should impose antitrust liability on pharmaceutical
companies solely on the basis of their excessive drug pricing.19

132.

See PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE: NOTES ON STARTUPS, OR HOW TO BUILD THE FUTURE 33

(2014) ("Monopolies drive progress because the promise of years or even decades of monopoly profits
provides a powerful incentive to innovate. Then monopolies can keep innovating because profits
enable them to make the long-term plans and to finance the ambitious research projects that firms
locked in competition can't dream of.").
133. Erin Duffin, Ranking of the 20 Companies with the Highest Spending on Research and
Development in 2018, STATISTA (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/265645/ranking

-of-the-20-companies-with-the-highest-spending-on-research-and-development/
[https://perma.cc
/2JVF-HHUC].
134. Kennedy, supra note 93, at 12 ("Firms need to be able to obtain 'Schumpertarian' profits to
reinvest in innovation that is both expensive and uncertain.").
135. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 124 and accompanying text

(describing deadweight loss from supracompetitive pricing).
136. Carlton & Heyer, supra note 123, at 287 ("Rigorous measurements by economic scholars
have demonstrated that investment and innovation are the dominant forces behind an economy's
advances in productivity and growth.").
137. See generally Harry First, Excessive DrugPricingAs an Antitrust Violation, 82 ANTITRUST

L.J. 701 (2019).
138. Id. at 711. First asserts that "courts should reconsider the ready assumption that Section 2
does not reach excessive pricing ... because we do actually condemn high prices in many areas of
antitrust law." Id. at 716. In support of that claim, he points to authorities condemning price increases
occasioned by cartels, anticompetitive mergers, and unreasonably exclusionary conduct. Id. Of
course, in each of those situations the price increase accompanied conduct that extended market power
(via combination, collusion, or exclusion). First cites no case in which a court has condemned
monopoly pricing absent some conduct extending market power.
139. Id. at 726-40.
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Other commentators have raised antitrust concerns about algorithmic
pricing systems in which digital platforms harness user data to estimate
online purchasers' willingness-to-pay and craft personalized prices.1 4 0
Such price discrimination schemes extract additional surplus from
consumers, but they do not extend sellers' market power. Compared to
the situation in which a seller with market power charges a single
supracompetitive price, personalized pricing may enhance total market
output and reduce deadweight loss, as buyers who value the product by
more than its incremental cost but less than the single supracompetitive
price are brought into the market.' 4
Commentators have also raised antitrust concerns about sharp
business practices that, while perhaps unsavory (or even tortious), do not
extend market power. John Newman, for example, points to what he calls
"digital blackmail." 42 That practice occurs when a digital platform
manipulates the publication of information in order to extract value from
some group of users.1 43 The platform may implicitly threaten either to
publish "bad" or to suppress "good" information.1 4 4 Real estate
comparison site Zillow allegedly engages in the former sort of digital
blackmail; it publishes market value estimates of listed properties, but it
will remove those that are below a listed property's sale price (and thus
have a depressive effect) in exchange for payments from the listing
agent.' 4 5 Restaurant review site Yelp allegedly engages in the "suppressthe-good" version of digital blackmail; it has purportedly threatened to
remove or demote favorable reviews of restaurants that decline to purchase
140.

DIGITAL

See, e.g., JASON FURMAN ET AL., UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION: REPORT OF THE

COMPETITION

EXPERT PANEL

111

(2019),

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk

/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/785547/unlocking digital competition f
urman reviewweb.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCW7-5F9G] (United Kingdom report on competition in
digital platform markets) ("Concerns have been raised that the increasing availability of data and use
of algorithms by businesses will enable them to personalise their product and service offerings. At
the extreme, personalised pricing could lead to each customer being offered an individual price based
on what the business infers they are willing to pay."); Morgan Wild & Marini Thome, A PriceofOne's
Own: An InvestigationInto PersonalisedPricingin EssentialMarkets, CITIZENS ADVICE (Aug. 2018),

https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/Global/CitizensAdvice/Consumer%/`20publications/A%/`20price%/`2
Oofo2Oone's%/`20own%/`20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3EV-AMBV].
141. See Carlton & Heyer, supra note 123, at 291 ("Antitrust hostility to [surplus-extractive price
discrimination] is in some respects quite surprising from the perspective of an economist, given that
simple monopoly pricing produces a clear and well-recognized static deadweight loss to the economy,
while these other forms of unilateral conduct are believed frequently (though not always) to increase
output, provide incentives for more effectively marketing a firm's products, or otherwise enhance[e]
welfare.").
142. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1535 (2019).

143. Id.
144. Id. ("Digital blackmail can occur when a dominant platform extracts rents by displaying (or
threatening to display) unwanted information, then charging victims for its removal or concealment.
Digital blackmail may also involve the inverse strategy: threatening to remove desirable information,
then charging victims for the 'privilege' of continuing to make it available.").
145. Id. at 1536-37.
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advertisements on its site."' Both forms of digital blackmail would appear
to involve significant business risk for the perpetrator. By manipulating
the information presented on their purportedly neutral sites, firms like
Zillow and Yelp risk turning off users. Rather than extending their market
power, they threaten it by inviting competition from truly neutral rivals.
In the short term, each of the aforementioned behaviors may reduce
consumer surplus and enhance the profits of the perpetrator. Some
instances might violate other provisions of law (e.g., prohibitions on
deceptive trade practices) and could well merit condemnation on nonantitrust grounds. But none of the practices extend market power. Given
the impracticability of forbidding, and the dynamic efficiencies that result
from allowing, mere surplus extraction, antitrust courts should follow
Judge Learned Hand in embracing the maxim/nis opus coronat-i.e., the
end of the work is the crown.' 4 7 They should tolerate mere exercises of
market power, reserving antitrust liability for behaviors that extend it.
C. Does Another Body ofLaw or Some Sort ofPrivate Ordering
Adequately Address the PotentialAnticompetitive Problem?
A third screening mechanism for twenty-first century antitrust
attempts to account for the law's unique enforcement structure.
Enforceable by private parties, the federal antitrust statutes entitle
successful plaintiffs to treble damages.'" The rationale for damagetrebling is that many antitrust violations-price-fixing conspiracies, etc.occur in secret and often are not detected and proven: if there is a one-third
chance of getting caught, requiring the defendant to pay three times the
damage caused will ensure optimal deterrence.
But damage-trebling may lead to overdeterrence when the challenged
behavior is (1) "mixed bag" (i.e., sometimes efficient and sometimes
inefficient), so that it should not be universally deterred, and (2) not
hidden, so that the likelihood that the conduct will be detected and proven
is greater than one-in-three.' 49 Given the difficulty of parsing pro- from
anti-competitive business conduct, mixed bag behavior is often wrongly
146. Id. at 1537.
147. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[A] strong
argument can be made that, although the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the
Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster:
finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon
when he wins.").
148. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018).
149. See HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 128, at 67 (2005) ("Treble

damages make no sense at all when they are assessed for public acts and reasonable minds can differ
about substantive illegality."); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 271-73 (2d ed. 2001)

(acknowledging that mandatory trebling may over-deter and advocating that damages multiplier be
adjusted to account for likelihood of concealment).
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condemned. If the behavior is open and notorious, it is certain to be
detected. Consider, then, a firm contemplating some pro-competitive,
non-clandestine conduct that might create difficulties for its competitors
and could therefore be wrongly condemned as anticompetitive. The firm
will engage in the contemplated conduct only if it would provide the firm
with private benefits greater than three times the harm to its rivals,
discounted by the likelihood of erroneous conviction. The upshot is that
many procompetitive instances of non-clandestine, mixed bag behavior
will be wrongly deterred.5 o
To account for potential overdeterrence resulting from trebling the
damages occasioned by non-clandestine competitive conduct, antitrust
should stay its hand when a potentially anticompetitive behavior occurs in
the open and another body of law or some sort of contract is likely to
prevent any anticompetitive harm the behavior may produce. The U.S.
Supreme Court appears to have endorsed this screening mechanism when
some regulationwould avert anticompetitive concerns.'' Courts should
similarly limit antitrust's reach when common law doctrines and privately
ordered solutions are likely to prevent anticompetitive concerns without
the distortive effects that may result from damage-trebling.
Application of this filter would likely have prevented several recent
enforcement actions against holders of standard essential patents (SEPs).
When a patented technology is incorporated into a technology standard (so
that the patent becomes "standard essential"), there is a risk that producers
utilizing the standard (implementers) will invest extensively and then face
unreasonable royalty demands from SEP-holders, who will know that the
implementers cannot utilize a different technology without incurring
exorbitant switching costs.15 2 To avert the risk of such "patent holdup,"
standard setting organizations (SSOs) typically procure upfront

150. Suppose, for example, that the non-clandestine, procompetitive conduct under consideration
by a firm would benefit it by $500,000 and consumers by $1.5 million but would cause rival harm of
$1 million. If there were a 25% chance of wrongful condemnation, the firm would not engage in the
welfare-enhancing conduct. Its expected liability of $750,000 ($3 million * 0.25) would exceed its
expected gain. Absent damage-trebling, which is unnecessary here to account for a lack of detection,
the firm would engage in the conduct. Its expected gain of $500,000 would exceed its expected
liability of $250,000 ($1 million * 0.25).
151. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279-84 (2007) (declining
to impose antitrust liability on the basis of initial public offering marketing practices that were
arguably unreasonable restraints of trade because practices were regulated by federal securities laws
and subject to active monitoring by Securities and Exchange Commission); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412-15 (2004) (refusing to impose antitrust duty to
deal with rivals when telecommunications statute imposed analogous regulatory duties).
152. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, PatentHoldup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1992-93 (2007) (discussing the problems of injunction threats and royalty stacking that
results from multiple patents on one product). See generally Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro
& Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (2007)
(discussing the threat of patent holdups).
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commitments from potential SEP-holders that if their technology is
included in the standard they will license it on fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.' 5 3
In recent years, the federal enforcement agencies have occasionally
concluded that antitrust should be used to police patent holdup, despite
these privately ordered solutions. For example, in separate actions against
Bosch and Motorola (along with its acquirer, Google), the FTC took the
position that a SEP-holder's pursuit of injunctive relief amounts to an
unfair method of competition.5 4 In In re NegotiatedData Solutions, LLC,
the FTC reasoned that antitrust precludes a SEP-holder from seeking to
renegotiate implementers' royalty agreements. "' In the pending FTC v.
Qualcomm Inc. case, which is currently on appeal, the FTC procured a
district court ruling that a SEP-holder has an antitrust duty-apart from
any FRAND commitment-to license its SEP to all its rivals if, at some
point in the past, it has profitably licensed the patent to any rival.'
In each of these cases, the allegedly anticompetitive behavior-pursuit
of injunctive relief, attempted renegotiation of royalties, refusal to license
to a rival-was not conducted in secret. Each challenged behavior can be
efficient: a holder of a FRAND-encumbered SEP might seek injunctive
relief because the infringer is judgment-proof or has rejected (or expressed

153.

See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND

COMPETITION 46-47 (2007),

www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4YG-AEEM]; see also Jorge L.
Contreras, A BriefHistory ofFR4ND: Analyzing CurrentDebates in StandardSetting andAntitrust
Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 39 n.3 (2015) (noting that FRAND ("fair,

reasonable, and non-discriminatory") and RAND ("reasonable and non-discriminatory") are
interchangeable terms).
154. See Robert Bosch GmbH, No. C-4377, 2012 WL 5944820, at *3, *20 (F.T.C. Nov. 21, 2012);
Motorola Mobility LLC, No. C-4410, 2013 WL 3944149, at *30-32 (F.T.C. July 23, 2013); see also
Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Whither Symmetry? Antitrust Analysis of Intellectual
PropertyRights at the FTC and DOJ, 9 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 41, 46 (2013) (observing that the

complaints and consent orders in Bosch and Motorola, "taken together, logically and necessarily
depend upon the presumption that protecting a valid SEP against infringement by obtaining injunctive
relief is itself anticompetitive."). The U.S. Department of Justice expressed a similar view about SEPholders' pursuit of exclusion orders. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO

VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 6 (2013) (withdrawn 2019) (endorsing the view that an

&

exclusion order based on a SEP generally should not be granted because "[a] decision maker could
conclude that the holder of a F/RAND-encumbered, standards-essential patent had attempted to use
an exclusion order to pressure an implementer of a standard to accept more onerous licensing terms
than the patent holder would be entitled to receive consistent with the F/RAND commitment."). This
statement was withdrawn in 2019 and replaced with a new policy statement. See U.S. PATENT
TRADEMARK OFFICE, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICY
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND

COMMITMENTS (2019).

155. See Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246 (F.T.C. Sept. 22, 2008)
(decision and order). The FTC argued that Vertical Networks engaged in unfair practices when it
attempted to break their licensing commitment. See id.
156. 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 757-64 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

20201

THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST IN THE 21ST CENTURY

1125

the intent to reject) a FRAND royalty; a SEP-holder might legitimately
renegotiate royalties in light of some market shift that undermines the
original royalty rate; a SEP-holder could refuse to license to its direct
rivals to prevent the sort of free-riding that diminishes incentives to
innovate. Finally, in each case, the alleged anticompetitive harm could
have been addressed-with less distortion from potential treble damages
actions-by another body of law:
* Pursuit of Injunctions and Exclusion Orders. Anticompetitive
holdup from SEP-holders' pursuit of injunctive relief or exclusion
orders would be prevented by patent and tariff laws, both of which
require the patent holder to establish that the requested relief is in
the public interest.15 7 A SEP-holder that was just seeking to gain
bargaining leverage to enhance its royalties-rather than seeking
the injunction for a legitimate reason, such as the fact that the
implementer was judgment-proof or had expressed an intention to
reject a FRAND royalty-could not make such a showing.
* Renegotiation Attempts. The duress defense under contract law
polices (by denying the enforceability of) renegotiations induced
by the sort of economic pressure involved in a patent holdup
situation. i5 Yet, contract law permits good faith renegotiationsthe sort of renegotiation a SEP-holder might legitimately seek in
light of a market shift that undermines the original royalty rate.159
Contract law is thus fully capable of preventing anticompetitive
holdup, while permitting reasonable renegotiations of SEP
royalties.
* Refusals to License to Rivals. A SEP-holder's obligation to license
to its rivals can be-and routinely is-imposed by the FRAND
commitment it makes to the SSO responsible for the technology
standard.i 6 0 (Indeed, the Qualcomm court held that Qualcomm had
157. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (positing requirements
for injunctive relief under patent act); see also J. Gregory Sidak, InternationalTrade Commission
Exclusion Ordersfor the Infringementof Standard-EssentialPatents, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

125, 151-52 (2016) (discussing public-interest limitations on exclusion orders and noting that
"Ambassador Froman found that, in this specific investigation, an exclusion order against Apple would
adversely affect the U.S. economy's competitive conditions and consumers").
158. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§§

175, 176 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)

(explaining when duress by threat renders a contract voidable and when a threat is improper); see also
Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971) (recognizing defense of
economic duress); Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902) (invoking
consideration doctrine to police economic duress resulting from holdup).
159. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 89

(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing for

modifications of executory contract terms in certain situations).
160. See Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Why PatentHold-Up Does Not Violate Antitrust
Law, 27 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2 (2019) ("[M]ost major SSOs require or urge all participants to
disclose intellectual property rights and commit to license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
(FRAND) terms.").
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a contractual duty to license its technology to rival chipmakers. 1 6i)
As intended third-party beneficiaries of FRAND agreements, rivals
may enforce them.1 6 2 Imposition of an antitrust duty to deals is thus
unnecessary, is likely to impair the quality of contracts between
SSOs and SEP-holders (why contract for a duty if a court is going
to impose it under positive law?), and denies SEP-holders and
SSOs the freedom to strike other bargains (e.g., limiting the duty to
license in appropriate circumstances).
When either another body of law or private ordering via contract is
likely to avert competitive harm, the marginal benefit afforded by antitrust
intervention will be low. If the behavior at issue is not hidden, so that the
likelihood of successful challenge is greater than one-in-three, antitrust
will tend to over-deter by chilling borderline procompetitive conduct,
which implies that the marginal cost of using antitrust to address the
competitive harm will be relatively high. In light of these low marginal
benefits and high marginal costs, antitrust should stay its hand when
another body of law would likely prevent competitive harms stemming
from open and notorious behavior.
D. Does the ContemplatedRemedy Require an Excess ofParticularized
Knowledge or Endow Government Officials with a Great Deal of
DiscretionaryAuthority?
A market failure, by itself, does not justify governmental intervention.
Policymakers should also have confidence that a contemplated
intervention will, not itself, impose losses greater than those stemming
from the market failure. This point is implicit in Easterbrook's directive
to craft antitrust policies that minimize the sum of error and decision costs:
losses from improvident interventions are Type I (false conviction) error
costs that must be balanced against the losses from allowing market power
to persist Type II (error costs).1 63 A final screening mechanism, which
should operate more as a guiding principle than a strict filter, highlights
considerations that are particularly important in striking this balance.
Just as markets may systematically fail under certain conditions (e.g.,
externalities, public goods, and market power), so may government
interventions. 164
Government failure is particularly likely in two
First, as F.A. Hayek famously observed, when the
circumstances.
161. FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 751-58 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

304 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("[T]he intended

beneficiary [of a contract] may enforce the duty.").
163. See Easterbrook, supranote 13, at 21.
164. See generally THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS

(2017) (examining systematic market and government failures).
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contemplated intervention requires central planners to acquire and process
troves of information that is widely dispersed among economic actors,
losses are likely to occur as the planners, who cannot gather and process
such information, misallocate productive resources away from their
highest and best ends. 16

Second, losses are particularly likely when interventions endow
government officials with great discretion over the allocation of
productive resources. As scholars associated with the "public choice"
economic tradition have demonstrated, discretionary authority invites
special interest manipulation of governmental power for private ends. 66
Rather than using their authority to maximize social welfare, government
officials-who retain their rational, self-interested natures when acting in
their official capacities-will frequently exercise state power in a manner
that benefits them personally. 6 7 Organized groups-often incumbent
firms-will find ways to exploit this tendency in their favor (e.g., by
lobbying officials or wooing them with the prospect of future
employment). The general public, which is injured by this special interest
manipulation, typically will not exert a counterbalancing influence over
government officials; because the costs of special interest manipulation
are widely dispersed, individual members of the public do not have an
adequate incentive to mount a response even if their losses, in the
aggregate, exceed the benefits that are concentrated on the organized
group(s). 161
In light of the Hayekian knowledge problem and public choice
concerns, courts and enforcers should typically avoid antitrust
interventions that either require a great deal of particularized knowledge
or endow government officials with a large store of discretionary
authority. This general guideline calls into question a number of recent
antitrust proposals.
One such proposal is to treat the user data collected by digital

165. See F.A. Hayek, The Use ofKnowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524-25 (1945).
166.

See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:

LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (explaining that as government has

grown, "the increased investment in organization aimed at securing differential gains by political
means is a predictable result"). For a succinct summary of the key insights of public choice, see
William F. Shughart II, Public Choice, in DAVID R. HENDERSON, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS 427-30 (2008).

167. See Shughart, supra note 166, at 428 ("[P]ublic choice, like the economic model of rational
behavior on which it rests, assumes that people are guided chiefly by their own self-interests and, more
important, that the motivations of people in the political process are no different from those of people
in the steak, housing, or car market. They are the same human beings, after all.").
168. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY

OF GROUPS 166-67 (8th ed. 1980).
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platforms like an essential facility that must be made available to rivals.169
In order to preserve the incentive to collect, store, and organize valuable
data, firms subject to a sharing duty must receive some sort of
compensation. Moreover, because user data vary in both usefulness and
difficulty of collection, the firms providing data to their rivals should be
entitled to different compensation for different types and quantities of data.
This means that a court imposing a duty to share data with rivals would
have to create an elaborate price schedule that takes into account such
information as the cost of collecting and organizing different sorts of data
and the value each sort provides-information that is largely inaccessible
and likely to change over time. Courts are ill-equipped to gather and
process all that information.
The Hayekian knowledge problem also bedevils recent calls to break
70
up the largest digital platforms-Google, Facebook, and Amazon.o
A
breakup of any firm requires a tremendous amount of knowledge about the
operation of the business and its various components, and the record on
antitrust breakups is far from encouraging.' 7 ' Indeed, in a detailed analysis
of seven major breakups under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, economist
Robert Crandall concluded that only one-the 1984 breakup of AT&Tincreased industry output and lowered prices.1 7 2 That unimpressive record
is for breakups of "old economy" firms that divided along natural fault
lines. Figuring out how to dissect highly integrated technology firms
without causing consumer harm would be far more difficult.
As Will Rinehart has observed, the leading digital platform firms
utilize business models, teams, and technologies that greatly complicate

&

169. See, e.g., JASON FURMAN ET AL., supra note 140, at 74-76 (2019) (recommending "data
openness as a tool to promote competition"); see also STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON.
THE STATE, STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS: FINAL REPORT 117 (2019) [hereinafter

STIGLER CENTER REPORT] ("[D]ata [sharing] forms a very important remedy in the toolkit of...
antitrust authority . . . ."); see also JACQUES CREMER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE & HEIKE
SCHWEITZER, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA 105-07 (2019) ("The sharing of data with

competitors may then promote competition and innovation in the industry.").
170. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Here's How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8,

2019),
https://medium.com/@Oteamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c
[https://perma.cc/SHW6-4W3A].
171. See Will Rinehart, A History of Failure: Government-Imposed Corporate Breakups, AM.

ACTION F. (June 27, 2018), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/a-history-of-failure
-government-imposed-corporate-breakups/
[https://perma.cc/W55S-B84Z] (arguing that past
breakups of companies including Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and AT&T "show how ineffective
this method is at creating competitive markets").
172. Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of StructuralRemedies in Sherman Act Monopolization
Cases, 82-83 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Studies, Working Paper No. 01-05, 2001), https://

www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03_monopolycrandall.pdf [https://perma.cc/KER
9-ZRH7]. Crandall observed that even the breakup of AT&T "turns out to be a case of overkill because
the same results could have been obtained through a simple regulatory rule, obviating the need for
vertical divestiture of AT&T." Id. at Executive Summary.
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their division.1 73 With respect to business models, the firms operate
multisided platforms where the value to users of one side (e.g., advertisers)
is largely dependent on the number and intensity of users on the other side
(e.g., individuals engaged in search or social networking).' 7 4 Moreover,
the firms tend to engage in internal cross-subsidization, using revenues
from one line of business (e.g., Google search) to support less profitable
services (e.g., Google's YouTube, which is widely assumed not to be
profitable on its own). 7 1 With multi-sided platform businesses engaged
in extensive cross-subsidization, an adverse effect on one part of the
business due to a government intervention can wreak havoc on other,
seemingly unrelated lines of business. To avoid consumer harm, a breakup
plan would have to accurately account for a highly complex set of
interrelationships.
Breaking up the digital platforms is also complicated by the fact that
they employ teams that work across the entire platform.
Facebook's
software engineers, for example, support Facebook, Messenger,
Instagram, and WhatsApp.' 77 Google uses common teams to support
Google Search, YouTube, Gmail, and more obscure parts of Google's
business, such as the Google File System, Bigtable, Spanner, MapReduce,
and Dremel. 7 " As Rinehart explains, "The result is a complex webbing of
distinct yet clearly interconnected organizational divisions. This webbing
makes implementing a Standard Oil-style trust-busting effort difficult at
best."179

Adding further complexity is the fact that the different parts of each
digital platform utilize a common suite of technologies (referred to as the
platform's technology "stack").'So
Facebook's stack, for example,
includes a number of proprietary technologies designed to assist with
common tasks engaged in by all its various services: "BigPipe" serves
173. Will Rinehart, Breaking Up Tech CompaniesMeans Breaking Up Teams and The Underlying

Technology, AM. ACTION F. (July 23, 2018), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/breaking
-up-tech-means-breaking-up-technology-and-teams/ [https://perma.cc/RW6U-WWVW] [hereinafter
Rinehart, Breaking Up Tech Companies].
174. See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 1 ISSUES

COMPETITIONL. & POL'Y 667, 670-71 (2008).
175. Rinehart, Breaking Up Tech Companies, supra note 173.

176. Id. ("Both companies rely upon flexible teams to solve problems that tend to cross the normal
divisional and functional bounds.").
177. Mike Isaac, ZuckerbergPlans to Integrate WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook Messenger,

N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/technology/facebook-instagram
-whatsapp-messenger.html [https://perma.cc/FD8Y-LNTF].
178. See Rinehart, Breaking Up Tech Companies, supra note 173; see also Why Breaking Up Big
Tech Could Do More Harm Than Good, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 26, 2019), https://

knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-breaking-up-big-tech-could-do-more-harm-than-good/
[https://perma.cc/4QMQ-6PTR].
179. Rinehart, Breaking Up Tech Companies, supra note 173.

180. Id.
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pages faster, "Haystack" stores "billions of photos efficiently," "Unicorn"
searches the social graph, "TAO" stores graph information, "Peregrine"
assists with querying, and "MysteryMachine" helps with performance
analysis.'" Facebook has also invested billions of dollars in data centers
designed to deliver video quickly, and it installed (with Microsoft) an
undersea cable to speed up information transmission.18 2 Google has
similarly developed a suite of technologies that are commonly used by its
various business units.83 As Rinehart observes, this technical integration
of the digital platforms raises a vexing question: "Where do you cut these
technologies when splitting up the compan[ies]?"' 4
Mistakes in
technological disintegration are likely to decrease productive efficiencies
substantially. As Wordsworth put it, "[w]e murder to dissect."""
Whereas proposals to treat user data as an essential facility and to
break up major digital platforms involve significant knowledge problems,
other recent antitrust proposals would endow government officials with
significant discretionary authority and thus raise public choice concerns.
One such proposal, discussed above, is to jettison the relatively cabined
consumer welfare standard in favor of a more amorphous public interest
standard.1 6 Another proposal is to create a federal agency with broad
powers to regulate digital platforms.s 7 A third proposal is aimed at
stemming anticompetitive harms from institutional investors' common
ownership of the stock of competing firms.iss
Responding to claims that horizontal shareholding has increased
prices by diminishing the incentive of commonly held firms to compete
with each other, Eric Posner, Fiona Scott Morton, and Glen Weyl have
proposed that the FTC and DOJ adopt an enforcement policy that would
encourage institutional investors to avoid intra-industry diversification in
concentrated industries that are susceptible to oligopolistic pricing.189
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id. (describing Google's technology stack and back-end integration).
Id.

185. William Wordsworth, The Tables Turned; An Evening Scene, on the Same Subject, in
WILLIAM WORDSWORTH & SAMUEL T. COLERIDGE, LYRICAL BALLADS, WITH A FEW OTHER POEMS

(1798) ("Our meddling intellect / Mis-shapes the beauteous form of things; / -We
dissect.").
186. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.

murder to

187. See Neil Chilson, Creatinga New FederalAgency to Regulate Big Tech Would Be a Disaster,

WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/30
/creating-new-federal-agency-regulate-big-tech-would-be-disaster/
[https://perma.cc/937L-ALGD].
Neil Chilson was responding to a proposal by the University of Chicago's Stigler Center for the
creation of a new federal Digital Authority. See STIGLER CENTER REPORT, supra note 169, at 10019.
188. See Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the
Anticompetitive Power ofInstitutionalInvestors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 669-70 (2017).

189. Id.

20201

THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST IN THE 21ST CENTURY

1131

Under the proposed policy, the agencies would annually compile a list of
oligopolistic industries.1 90 Investors in such industries could avoid
antitrust liability by holding less than one percent of total industry equity
or, if they held more than that amount, by holding stock of only one firm
per industry.191
Because the term oligopoly (unlike "market" in the antitrust context)
lacks any agreed-upon meaning, agency officials would have wide
discretion in determining what industries made the list.1 9 2 Moreover,
designation as an official oligopoly could have significant consequences
beyond the context of common ownership. As Michael Sykuta and I have
elsewhere detailed, Posner et al.'s proposal, which would move the FTC
and DOJ out of their traditional role as ex post law enforcers and in the
direction of ex ante regulators, would create significant public choice
concerns:
If the agencies were to designate entire industries as oligopolistic . .
interest groups would almost certainly join the fray. Having their
industry designated oligopolistic would raise the antitrust risk firms face
from all sorts of practices. . . . In light of this enhanced antitrust risk (not
to mention the risk that official designation as an oligopoly could spark
direct regulation), industry participants could be expected to mount a
vigorous opposition to any attempt to designate their industry as
oligopolistic. At the same time, groups with an interest in heightened
antitrust scrutiny within an industry-e.g., consumer groups, vertically
related firms that could benefit from greater restriction on industry
participants-would invest resources to secure the industry's inclusion
on the list of oligopolies. Indeed, the proposal by Posner et al. invites
interest group involvement (and the social costs associated therewith) by
specifying that "[t] here would be some mechanism to solicit comments
from any interested parties. "93
None of this is to say, of course, that antitrust interventions should

190. The proposed enforcement policy contemplates that:
Prior to the start of each calendar year, the DOJ and FTC would make a list of industries
constituting oligopolies. . . . There would be some mechanism to solicit comments from
any interested parties. The DOJ and FTC would then finalize the list with at least a month
before the beginning of the new year to allow the institutional investors time to rearrange
their holdings to comply with the policy.
Id. at 708-09.
191. Id. at 678.
192. Thomas A. Lambert & Michael E. Sykuta, The Case for Doing Nothing About Institutional
Investors' Common Ownership ofSmall Stakes in Competing Firms, 13 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 213, 260

(2019) ("The term 'industry' . .. has no ... economically informed, tractable definition ....
Moreover, once an industry is defined, there will have to be criteria for declaring it to be
oligopolistic.").
193. Id. at 260-61 (quoting Posner et al., supra note 188, at 709).
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never involve complicated fact-finding or confer discretionary authority
on government officials. As noted, this final screening mechanism is more
a guideline than a strict filter. But just as antitrust courts learn from
experience with business practices and adjust presumptions accordingly,
courts and policymakers should do the same with experiences of
government practices. Because experience has shown that interventions
are especially likely to misfire when they entail high knowledge
requirements or excessive discretion, such interventions should be
examined under a (rebuttable) presumption of error.
CONCLUSION

As Dan Crane has observed, "[a]ntitrust law stands at its most fluid
and negotiable moment in a generation." 9 4 Popular commentators and
scholars alike are questioning such seemingly settled doctrines as the
consumer welfare standard. Widespread discontent with various social
conditions-from economic inequality, to political polarization, to
concerns about data privacy-has generated calls for antitrust to do more.
But antitrust remains a fundamentally limited enterprise, as Judge
Easterbrook famously observed.1 95 While a few of Easterbrook's specific
suggestions require adjustment in light of market developments and
advances in economic learning, his overarching directive, and several of
his proposed screening mechanisms, remain sound.
As courts and enforcers confront an ever-growing chorus calling for
bigger and bolder antitrust, they would do well to embrace Easterbrook's
general model, revise some specifics, and supplement it with four
additional filters that limit antitrust's reach. In particular, they should limit
interventions to instances of consumer harm arising from behavior that
extends market power, where no other body of law or instance of private
ordering is likely to prevent the harms at issue with less distortive effect,
and the remedy imposed does not entail excessive knowledge
requirements or conferral of discretionary governmental authority. Such
an approach may disappoint those who imagine that antitrust can solve a
host of social problems, but it alone will ensure that twenty-first century
antitrust actually succeeds at the things antitrust in fact does well.

194. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust's Unconventional Politics, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 118
(2018).

195. See generallyEasterbrook, supra note 13.

